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FOREWORD 
This volume, Volume IV of a four-volume report, 
summarizes the results of a twelve-month study of 
manned space mission duration extension problems 
conducted between 1 October 1966 and 1 October 1967. 
This material was developed under a company- 
funded effort with the intent of determining the 
requirements and constraints imposed on man, the 
mission, and the mission subsystems, by extending 
manned space missions to 700 days duration, using 
contemporary hardware. The study was conducted 
in conjunction with that of the Manned Planetary 
Flyby Missions based on Saturn/Apollo Systems 
(NAS8-18025 was conducted for NASA/MSFC by NAR/ 
SD) during the same time period. 
‘ 
The Systems Engineering Management department 
of the Space Division of the North American Rockwell 
Corporation, performed the study under Re search 
Authorization R A  2195- 15400. Documentation was 
contracted for by the Mission Analysis Division of 
NASA/OART, Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, 
California under contract NAS2-4214. f 
2 
Roy B. Carpenter, Jr., who was both program 
manager and project engineer, Systems Engineering 
Management, Research, Engineering and Test Divi- 
sion of NR/SD, directed the work. 
were provided by many SD and subcontractor per- 
sonnel as indicated in the appropriate v o l m e s ,  
Contributions 
The value of this study cannot be measured by the 
investment made by either NR/SD or the NASA 
because of the subcontractor participation. 
been estimated that the total involved effort exceeds 
that of a 12-man-year contracted study. 
It has 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
. E  
The Space Division of the North American Rockwell Corporation has 
been studying the problems associated with extending space mission dura- 
tions for the past five years. 
planetary exploration problem and have attempted to identify the problem 
areas  a s  well a s  the best  mission/system concept and the associated exper- 
iment programs. Closely associated with these studies, and at times a part  
of these studies, a r e  the investigation into system failure mechanics and the 
r eliabilityl crew safety improvement effort. 
These studies have been addressed to the 
As the result of one such effort conducted under a NASA/MSC contract 
(NAS 9-3499) a concept was developed which seems to facilitate a mission 
system design that would assure  safe missions and be nearly independent of 
the duration. As a result, anhaddendm t o  that contract was awarded t o  SD 
to make application of the concept to one system and demonstrate feasibility. 
This was successfully accomplished i n  June 1965. 
i the duration 
- 
company-funded effort and to  sponsor several briefings. 
efforts a r e  summarized in this volume. 
1 .2  THE OBJECTIVES 
The results of these 
This study was conducted with three main objectives in mind: 
1. To demonstrate the feasibility of extended duration space missions 
through the application of the Availability Concept to a mission/ 
system design. 
t 
2. To determine the extended mission capability using contemporary 
' hardware. 
3, To develop a more quantitative assessment of the following factors 
as  they affect achievement of a probability of safe return of 0.99. 
a. Space mission extension capability as a function of the 
maintenance and repair concept. 
- 1 -  
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b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
The quantity of maintenance and repair actions to be expected 
and prepared fo r  and the resultant crew work load. 
The type of maintenance and repair actions required of the 
crew, specifically a s  it affects extravehicular activities. 
The weight penalty imposed on the mission system a s  the 
result of having to perform maintenance actions. 
The potential advantages of selecting the optimum operational 
concept a s  it affects crew safe return. 
The effects of potential design improvements, 
4. A s  a secondary objective, it was deemed desirable, in general, to 
make applications of the results to Earth Orbital missions. 
1.3 THE DATA BASELINE 
One of the most difficult problems encountered in the assessment of 
mission safety and reliability i s  in selecting the data base. 
the data i s  taken from the available failure rate tables. 
assessment may or may not bear any resemblance to the design situation. 
Because of the circumstances involved, there is usually no other alternative, 
but the results a r e  always suspect. 
Historically, 
As a result, the 
The Apollo program is now in i ts  fifth year and data i s  now available 
to facilitate a valid analysis of space mission capability which is representa- 
tive of the actual situation fo r  the 1970 time period. 
f r o m  5,000 to 25,000 hours of test data at the system level and from 20,000 to 
over one million hours a t  the lower levels of assembly. A s  a result, statis- 
tical confidence can be established in  the veracity of the predicted mean time 
before failure, their qualification status and space rating. 
These systems have 
.’-* 
Apollo systems and components were used to synthesize systems 
designs and the relevant data provided the basis fo r  estimating contemporary 
hardware capability and the support requirements. 
The attractiveness of this approach can be readily understood when it 
is realized that the commonality in critical system functional requirements 
make projections f r o m  one mission to any number of diverse missions 
possible, with little compromise in the results - given that the data base was 
valid. Further, because the specific potential problem areas a r e  identified, 
specific application can even be made to  unmanned missions. 
- 2 -  
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1.4 THE EXTENDED MISSION PRO 
NOTE: A word of caution must be interjected here in terms of appli- 
cation of these data. Although the numerics applied are the 
best available, they are only estimates and, in particular, 
the effects of long duration spaceflight are yet to be 
determined-for the majority of components. 
SD studies over the past few years have shown conclusively that it is 
impractical to attempt to design a failure-free spacecraft fo r  missions 
approaching or exceeding one year in duration. 
a r e  expressed by the curves and data of Figure 1. 1. 
indicates that, during the next decade, it may be impractical to attempt 
design of a spacecraft f o r  maintenance-free operations for missions in 
excess of even 45 days. 
design for a manned spacecraft depend on the selected mission profile and 
objective s. 
The results of these studies 
Further, the data in 
The practical mission limits for a non-maintainable 
A s  missions a r e  extended in time and the abort profiles become more 
complex and time consuming, equipment failure becomes virtually certain. 
Further, a point is reached where adding redundancy no longer compensates 
for  potential failures. Rather, this adds to the failure hazard. This tech- 
nology limit i s  created by the need to include switching devices, performance 
monitors and voting circuits, as well a s  the wiring or plumbing, into the 
function reliability assessment. The practical limit seems to be between 
two and three components in simple redundancy. 
ance must be considered as  a more reasonable alternative, i f  for no other 
reason than the reduced operational complexity. 
Beyond this point, mainten- 
This study is concerned with mission durations measured in years. 
The approximate mission reliability requirements,in te rms  of mean time 
before failure (MTBF) ,disregarding maintenance,are shown below. 
' 
\ 
CAPABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS 
- 3 -  
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As indicated, i f  no failures a r e  to be tolerated, these estimates fall 
far short of the expressed requirements - literally by orders of magnitude. 
Further, this same study indicated that, on the average, system MTBF can 
be improved over any decade by factors of between 5 and 10. The effect of 
applying those systems to the longer space missions a r e  a s  indicated on 
Figure 1. 1. \=" 
Obviously, r eliability improvements do not hold the complete answer 
and the longer missions must be prepared for  failures. 
have suggested that a possible alternative would include abort, spacecraft 
lunar area missions, none of these will assure crew survival because of the 
long recovery times required. 
Some study results 
.L replacement, escape capsules, or rescue. But, for the planetary and many \ 
Since failures a r e  to be expected, it would be well to understand the 
mechanics of failure. 
failure seems probable, the impression created leaves one with a feeling of 
impending catastrophe; but, this is  usually far from the truth. 
Figure 1. 2 where a plot of system function status is presented as  a function 
of mission elapsed time. Note that when a failure occurs, usually only one 
function within that system is affected. 
affected, but it i s  most unlikely that a whole system or any subsystem will 
Reliability estimates a r e  misleading because i f  a 
Refer to 
At times several functions a r e  
/APOLLO MISSION 
VENUS LIGHTSIDE FLYBY 
MARS TWILIGHT FLYBY1 J R 
--\ 
1970 TECHNOLOG7 -I 
ORDER-OF-MAGNITUDE INCREASE ---\ 
IN 1970 TECHNOLOGY 
__-a_ -____8_ -+ DESIRED LEVEL OF SYS RELIABILITY -- 
TIME (MISSION DURATION) 
SYSTEM M T B F  SYSTEM 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
0 2000 6000 10,000 14,000 18,000 
TIME (MISSION DURATION-HRS) 
'Figure 1. 1 The Mission Extension Problem 
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fail completely, 
value or the potential availability of the system(s). 
measure of the effectiveness of maintainable designs. 
Note too that the te rm "availability" expresses the aver 
This term is a goal 
,:'i/ ,- 
In considering th er i ts  of a maintenance concept it i s  a l so  essential 
to know how many failures a r e  likely to occur. Figure 1.3 presents these 
data a s  a function of mission duration and the required level for  the prob- 
about 270 failures ability of safe return (Ps), Note that for  Ps - 
be planned for the two-year mission even^ t h u  
> 
ss  is expected, 
It is e t failures must be anticipated and repair expected. 
Also, that the effects of failure will normally be limited to one function, and 
that the nurnber of failures or subsequent repair actions will be modest - 
perhaps less than one in three days. 
y 
1. 5 THE AVAILABILITY CONCEPT 
The availability concept i s  a design or mission analysis technique that 
facilitates the determination of an optimum man-machine relationship. 
Mission effectiveness is maximized through establishment of a safe and 
reasonable balance between system and mission performance, operation 
control, reliability, and maintainability. Application of this concept can 
result in a mission/system design that provides maxim- operational 
availability of the system functions within the constraints imposed by crew 
capabilities, mission requirements, and existing technology, thus maximizing 
the potential mission success and crew safety. 
I' The availability concept a s  an analyticalldesign tool i s  presented in 
- I  \ logic f o r m  in Figure 1.4, Before application, the system reliability/safety 
logic has been prepared in simplified form, with the weak links:: identified 
in order of weakness. Then, starting with the weakest, the analytical logic 
is applied to each block (x. X. x. i) in sequence, until the safety/success goal 
is achieved, or surpassed. 
this report and applied to individual systems in Volume III. 
A detailed explanation is given in Volume I of 
The key to the analysis is to determine what level of assembly to work 
Each weak link must be treated a s  an individual case; the most 
on, and the most effective/safe corrective action required to reduce a failure 
hazard. 
probable failure modes a r e  isolated, and then appropriate action determined. 
Computers can only be used in a bookkeeping role because each decision must 
be made, based on the specific situation. 
appropriate . 
Weak  Links are the more failure prone components of a system. 
A spare will not always be 
--__--- - 11--- _ _ " ~  -_ . __________II ____________ 
- 5 -  
SD 67-478-4 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
MISSION ELAPSED TIME - -- ~ I __- 
\ W h e r e - R e p a i r  is Permitted 
1 
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The selection criteria must include accessibility, least nuxnber of I 
spares per weak link, least number and complexity of repairs per weak link, 
ease of maintenance, least redundancy, and simple monitoring and diagnosis& 
Redundancy i s  a less desirable alternative because interchangeability of 
spares i s  reduced. 
maintenance can have a profound influence on the resulting mission require- 
ments. 
how failure risk is distributed within the specific system, functions, assem- 
blies, or parts, 
displays a low reliability a t  the system level. 
still contributed most of the failure hazard. However, a t  the part level, 
three assemblies exhibit equal risk of failure. The one assembly which 
contains all  those parts could be spared, or the three parts could be spared. 
Thus, the choice was an obvious one since the spare assembly is small and 
lightweight, easy to diagnose, and easy to replace. 
The process of selecting the level of assembly for  
To assure maximum mission efficiency, it i s  necessary t o  determine 
From the example of Figure 1. 5, note that only one function 
,/" 
2 
Further, only one assembly 
Obviously, the concept depends on the ability to perform maintenance 
and repair. 
of the problem, it i s  desirable to review the logical process associated with 
system failure and correction. These activities a r e  presented in Figure 1. 6. 
Note that the darker blocks indicate those data derived during this study, 
From this, it i s  evident that the following requirements and constraints must 
be defined and satisfied. 
Therefore, in order to facilitate an understanding of this aspect 
I 
/ \  ' 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
A spare parts complement is provided to meet the repair and 
replacement needs to a risk level compatible with the mission 
goals. 
A performance monitor is designed t o  facilitate identification of 
system malfunctions when and where they a r e  most likely to occur. 
Diagnostic equipment is designed to isolate malfunctions in the 
potentially weak system functions. 
Tools a r e  selected to aid the crewman in making the M&R action 
within the constraints imposed on the crewman by the mission 
environment. 
Backup support systems and/or redundant systems necessary to 
a s  sure performance of critical functions during the M&R cycles. 
Maintainable systems a r e  designed to facilitate the maintenance 
and/or repair of those functions identified a s  potential weak links. 
SD 67-478-4 
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S AT1 S FAC TORY 
AREAS COVERED BY THIS STUDY 
!Figure 1 . 6  Failure and Correction - Analytical Logic 
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1.6 THE STUDY APPROACH 
The study was conducted a s  
data from the SD study, "MannAd 
Apollo Systems, ' I  provided the bas 
to  the conceptual level. 
ted by the logic of Figure 1. 7. 
a r y  Flyby Missions Based on Saturn/ 
mission and syst 
The 
This study selected specific h 
Midway through this study it became apparent that, in  order to  perform 
the proposed analysis to the level of depth necessary for meaningful resu 
it would be necessary to define the systems design to the point where specific 
hardware could be identified. 
the study, it was decided that subcontractors who were known to  be expert in 
the individual fields should be solicited for support. 
contractors, who agreed to  participate by defining and analyzing the system 
functions a s  listed, provided gratifying results. 
suggested statement of work along the lines indicated in  the study logic and 
performed the study at their expense excepting as noted: 
To accomplish this task within the scope of 
The following sub- 
Each was provided a 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7 .  
8. 
9.  
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
A. C. Electronics 
Aerojet General 
AiRes earth::: 
Allison Division of G. M. 
Atomics International** 
Bell Aerosystems 
Collins Radio Corp 
Dalmo Victor  Corp 
Eagle -Pitcher 
General Time Corp 
Honeywell Corp 
Marquardt Co r p  
Motorola Inc 
Raytheon Mfg Company 
Simrnonds 
*Taken from several funded studies, plus consultation. 
"Taken from a former funded study. 
Guidance and Navigation 
Pro  pul s ion Engin e s 
Environment Control and 
Propellant Tankage 
Electrical Power Source 
Positive Expulsion Tankage 
Communications, Voice and 
Deep Space and Probe Com. 
Earth Entry and Peaking 
Central Timing Equipment 
Attitude, Stability and 
Spin/Despin Control 
Reaction Control and 
S p inup / De s pin En gin e s 
Up Data Link 
Guidance Computer 
Propellant Gaging 
Life Support 
Telemetry 
Antenna 
Batt e r ie  s 
- '9" - 
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2.0 THE EXTENDED MISSION CHARACTERISTICS 
AND COMMONALITIES 
2.1 THE BASELINE PLANETARY MISSION 
The baseline mission selected for this study was taken from one of the 
candidate missions identified in the previously referenced study (NAS8- 18025). 
It involves a 1977 departure date for a single planet flyby of Mars. 
level functional flow is presented in Figure 2. 1 along with the second level 
for selected mission phases and their respective duration. Although this may 
not be the actual mission finally selected, it includes al l  of the characteristics 
and functional requirements of any near planet missions exclusive of the 
scientific objectives. 
The top 
The study of mission characteristics and requirements indicated that 
the missions vary only in  the length of specific phases and the number of 
times a phase i s  repeated. Therefore, i f  the baseline mission includes all 
the potential types of phases and they a r e  a s  long or longer than the selected 
mission, the resulting requirements and constraints identified will, for the 
most part, represent "worse case" situations. 
selected baseline. 
Such i s  the case with the 
Artificial gravity was assumed to be a requirement for the long trans- 
planet/transearth coast periods because it imposed the requirement for addi- 
tional system functions and reduced the duty cycle requirement on key system 
functions. For  additional argwnents for the artificial gravity mode, based on 
system/missions effectiveness, see Volume 111 of this report. The artificial 
gravity mode i s  justified on the basis of the measurable improvement in crew 
safety possible and the resultant reduction in crew work load and energy 
consumption. 
2.2 THE BASELINE SPACECRAFT 
The spacecraft used for the study baseline is presented in Figures 2.2 
and 2. 3. 
descriptions were derived by the participating subcontractors and NR/SD 
using Apollo/AAP derivations. 
identified to fu l f i l l  the required functional requirements. For details, see 
Volume III and the references thereiqof particular interest i s  the following: 
It was taken from the NAS8-18025 study. The detailed subsystem 
In each case specific system hardware was 
The Environment Control and Life Support System included both storable 
0 2 ,  under high pressure and cryogenics conditions, and a Bosch Reactor/ 
Electrolysis Cell a s  a backup/02 recovery system. The electrical power 
- 1,i - 
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\ 
nctional Flow Logic 
AFT COURSE CORRECTION THRUST VECTOJ 
TRAVE DIRECT1 
ZERO-GRAVITY CONFIGURATION 
~ 
. 
/Figure 2. 2 Spacecraft Int anetary Configuration 
----_ - - 
EXPERIMENT/ELECTRICAL POWER S E C T I O N  
F W D  ADAPTER (EMERGENCY POWER, MARS PROBE COMPARTMENT 
AND LSS GAS STORAGE) 
1 *> 
i d L  
4 - M A N  M I S S I O N  M O D U L E  SCIENTIFIC TELESCOPE 
e r e - 2 . 3  Spacecraft 
- li! - 
/SD 67-478-4 
1 SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATI 
system included an  Isotppe-Organic Rankine as the primary source with an  
Isotope Thermoelectric backup with batteries for peaking and earth entry. 
The stability control was similar to Apollo. 
functions used Apollo components. The G&N was assumed to be the Apollo 
system with earth control as  the primary mode, except during planet flyby. 
The communication system was assurned to be Apollo with the addition of 
higher data capability, a 500-watt amplifier and a 19-foot dish to the existing 
antenna. Other functions such as the Apollo Up-Data Link, Fuel Tanks, and 
the Central Timing Equipment, were  found to be adequate. The midcourse 
propulsion was assumed to be provided by three Apollo/LEM engines. 
The spin control and engine 
2 . 3  EARTH ORBITAL PLANETARY MISSION COMMONALITIES 
Because of the increased interest in  extended earth orbital missions, 
it i s  essential to show the relationships between the requirements for extended 
lunar, planetary, and the earth orbital missions. 
demonstrate the applicability of this study results to all types of extended 
space missions, it i s  desirable to review the characteristics of these missions 
and establish points of Commonality. 
For this reason, and to 
1 ____ ~ _ _ _ ~  -~ 
Figure 2 .4  presents, in functional flow, the operations required t o  per- 
The f i rs t  level is general 
form either an earthorbital mission, or the baseline planetary flyby. 
Earthorbi t  (E.O.) missions provided the E.O. data. 
enough to describe both mission classes. Differences inthe first three phases 
a re  minor except for the number of launches or rendezvous required, resulting 
in the same functional requirements for both missions. 
where differences may be expected to appear, there i s  a stahling similarity' 
The A A P  
1 '  
, *m --- - 
At the second level, 
~ I_ 
in both the operations for a given phase and resultant subsystem functional 
requirements. During the preliminary earth orbital phase, both missions 
require checkout in  orbit, both make velocity changes - the difference being 
only in the direction and magnitude of the vector. 
functional requirements a r e  the same. During the mission operations phase 
both have long periods of inactive coasts interrupted by velocity corrections; 
again, the differences exist only in the duration of these coast periods and 
the magnitude of the velocity vectors. 
Therefore, the resultant 
The major differences in  the two mission classes exist in the planet 
flyby period where probes a r e  launched and recovered, or in the earth orbit 
resupply operations. 
coast period except for the high degree of scientific support activity, How- 
operations constitute the only different type of operation. But, even there, 
it is equivalent to an additional rendezvous operation which was required in  
The planet flyby is very similar in  nature to any 
The earth orbital resupply :ever, this has little effect on crew safety. 
f the planetary missions a -- 
- 13 - 
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1ST LEVEL FUNCTIONAL FLOW (BOTH MISSIONS) 
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- 
The results of the commonality analysis indicate that there a r e  few 
differences in the earth orbital and lunar/planetary flyby missions a s  they 
affect the mission system functional requirements, These differences a r e  
manifest in the form of the length of a given operation, and where the functions 
, i,e,, .with respect to  the spa& st ar, the logistic vehi 
nd with respect to the Mission M or the Reentry 
module, in the other case. 
2.4 UNDERSTANDING RELIABILITY AND CREW SAFETY OBJECTIVES 
v The so-called I1numbers" game which has of late been associated with 
the field of reliability has lead to a lack of understanding and disbelief in 
reliability estimates, in general. 
of 0 .90  means nothing unless it i s  made clear what factors a r e  contained in 
the logic which permitted the assessment. The fact that a failure occurs 
does not mean that the mission was unsuccessful; for example, a l l  the 
Mercury missions encountered failures but none were considered unsuc- 
cessful, or even unreliable. In fact, all were evaluated a s  highly successful. 
To state that a mission has a reliability 
".- :9 
F o r  this reason NR/SD has elected to use the Probability of Crew Safe 
Return (Ps) a s  the primary measure of reliability. 
probability of the crew returning safely to earth. 
this criteria to a space mission is perhaps surprising because some functions 
that were formerly considered critical were found to not actually affect Ps. 
Such functions as communications could honestly be considered less critical. 
A s  a result of this situation, SD established three criticality classes into 
which the different spacecraft functions were separated to facilitate an 
understanding of what i s  inferred by the safety/success assessments. 
The classification i s  based on the criticality of the function as f 
This indicates the 
The results of applying 
-.. 
Criticality I applies to those functions and components directly afficting 
the crew safe return (Ps). ' 
Criticality I1 applies to those functions and components not required to 
achieve PR, but a r e  required to accomplish the mission in the manner 
prescribed, 
cations and artificial gravity a r e  examples, 
These were called "crew comfort" functions; communi- 
Criticality 111 applies to those functions associated with obtaining and 
processing the scientific data, and a r e  not required for  the first  two 
classes, This class was not evaluated during this study. 
- 115 - 
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2.5 THE EXTENDED MISSION SYSTEM WEAKNESSES 
The baseline mission systems requirement analysis revealed that some 
/' systems had to operate nearly one hundred percent of the time while others 
operated as low as five percent of the time. See Table 2. 1, 
/' " 
1. \ 
The result of imposing the duty cycle requirements on the baseline 
mission system which a r e  made up of contemporary data is reflected in  the 
bar graph of Figure 2. 5. 
failure hazard, and therefore those requiring the most attention during the 
analysis, can be identified. 
contribute an unacceptable failure potential. Further, since it was an 
objective of this study to equalize the hazard of failure a t  a acceptably low 
level, it i s  evident that support requirements will have to be distributed 
between the systems in proportion to the bars. 
From this, the systems that contribute the highest 
It i s  also evident that all of the systems will 
- 
Table 2-1. System Duty-Cycle Requirement fo r  a Manned 
/ i I / 
Function 
Guidance and navigation 
C ommunications 
Stability control 
Propulsion motor 
"G" control engines 
Life support 
Environmental contr 01 
Electrical power system 
Duty - C y cl e Estimates :g 
. " I *  
-.- /, 
5 '% 
10 to 3070 
6% 
5 >cycles 
16 to 20 cycles 
100% 
100% 
100% 
*Based on a typical Mars flyby mission 
800 hours 
54, 800 hours 
9 60 hours 
16,000 hours 
1 6 , 0 0 0  hours 
16,000 hours 
- 16 - 
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3.0 THE EXTENDED MISSION CONSTRAINTS 
3.1 MAINTENANCE TIME CONSTRAINTS 
Mission requirements and constraints stem from the need to support 
both man and mission commitments a s  indicated in Figure 3. 1. 
functions become inoperative, either the crew and/or the mission commit- 
ments a re  endangered. 
failure occurrence and the non-rever sible emergency situation; these form 
maintenance time constraints. Maintenance or repair action i s  effective only 
so long a s  the mission can continue safely without the function, or i f  a backup 
function (or system) i s  available for use during the repair action. 
When these 
However, there i s  a time differential between the 
It i s  logical to assume that the function i s  required during some specific 
part of the mission, or a percentage of the total duration, perhaps randomly 
distributed throughout the mission, Also, it i s  just a s  logical to assume that 
the mission can proceed in a degraded mode, though perhaps only for  a short 
period of time. 
maintenance and the unscheduled repair or replacement actions. 
time constraint is therefore defined as:  
If this is true, that period can be used for both periodic 
The down- 
A restriction imposed on the total allowable elapsed 
time that a mission svstem function can be out of 
service before a situation is created that would result 
in  ultimate loss of the mission spacecraft and/or crew. 
It should be recognized that downtime constraints a r e  not always 
described by a single value defining an all-black or all-white situation. 
or function degradation may be gradual a s  in the case of C 0 2  buildup. 
almost instantaneous, a s  would be the case a t  rapid decompression. 
Crew 
Or, 
Figure 3. 2 presents the results of CO2 systems removal function c 
failure as a function of downtime. 
safe downtime for  the four-man crew with 700 f t3  of free volwne in the cabin. 
Note that there i s  a t  least 140 hours of 
\ 
The results of the system function downtime constraints analysis i s  
Note that most functions can be down for  over summarized in Table 3. 1. 
24 hours. 
corrections and earth entry). 
cumvented by some design action such as a redundant function. 
Few a r e  sensitive at  very specific time periods only (perigee 
Most of the other situations could be cir-  
- 17 - 
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APPROACH 
CORRECTION 
I STAB1 L l  ZE D PLAT FOR M I 
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IFigure 3.'1 Sources of Requirements and Constraints 
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EVENTUAL DE 
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(1000 FT3/MAN) 
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PERFORMANCE 
DEGRADATION 
MINOR DISCOMFORT 
Figure 3 . 2  How is Failure Hazard Distributed 
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'Table 3- 1. Planetary Mission System Downtime Constraints 
System, Function 
Stability control 
Attitude control 
Velocity control 
Atmospheric pressure 
Oxygen 
Nitrogen 
Carbon-dioxide removal 
Cabin temperature 
Isotope temperature 
Cabin humidity 
Communication 
Guidance o r  navigation 
Water supply 
Food supply 
Downtime Constraint (hr) 
0. 2 
Over 24 (repairs) 
7 at perigee (planet) 
15 at earth arrival 
Over 24 otherwise 
Same as  above 
Most of mission 
0. 3 a t  earth arrival 
0. 1 to 0. 3 
Over 24 
120 to 210 
1300 to m 
2 0  to 40F Jorx2eatEr 
2 to 4 minimum 
1. 2 
1. 8 to 3 .  0 minimum 
No practical limit 
No limit - during midcourse 
7. 0 a t  planet 
0. 3 at  earth arrival 
Over 24 
Over 720 
Causation and Remarks 
Required to neutralize worse-case spinup. 
Repair time limited only by mission- 
profile commitment s. 
Limited by mission-profile commitments. 
Limited by miss ion -pr ofile commitments. 
Earth-arrival retro; must be made within 
a narrow time frame. 
Assumes meteoroid puncture of 1 inch o r  
greater; r isk i s  less than 1/100. 
Other causations. 
Metabolic consumption and leakage; 
depends on cabin size. 
Can operate without it. 
Crew tolerance limits build up but 
increase only results it, reduced effi- 
ciency until about 40 
cabin size. 
Depends on cabin size, equipment oper- 
ating, position and attitude with relation 
to sun, and the thermal inertia of the 
spacecraft. 
Coolant required to stabilize isotope 
temperature; loss of control will result 
in loss of power and radiation 
contamination. 
100-percent humidity wi l l  result in con- 
densate on cold surfaces, eventual 
electrical shorts, and corrosion of 
critical elements. 
Not required except for primary guidance 
and navigation data sometime during mid- 
course and prior to planet arrival. 
Earth support primary most of the time 
as  long as  communication system 
functions. 
Required to facilitate accurate velocity 
correction. 
Required to facilitate acquisition of entry 
corridor. 
Proper temperature control can extend 
this considerably. 
Rationing of any form can extend this 
indefinitely. 
hours; depends on 
SD 67-478-4 
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4 The data clearly indicates that adequate time is available to  perform 
required maintenance actions and there probably is no critical situations. 
3.2 CREW CONSTRAINTS 
The crew imposes constraints on the mission systems design due to 
the result of their ability or inability to perform useful work in the projected 
situation. 
force producing capability and the associated metabolic costs. 
These constraints take the form of maintenance time requirements, 
Time requirements come from the active repair time required by a I 
crewman to perform a given task. 
showed that 9.5 percent of the projected tasks could probably be performed in  
less  than two hours, under normal working conditions. 
by the effects of working condition impediments such a s  those assessed in 
Figure 3. 3B. 
nearer to six hours. 
A s  indicated by Figure 3.3A, the study 
// This must be modified 
Note that under EVA conditions the 95 percentile could be 
Force producing capability was found to vary, considerably as a function 
of working conditions. As indicated by Figure 3.4, his ability to produce a 
translatory force drops rapidly a s  the work a rea  becomes more awkward to 
reach; zero g reduces his capability even more. 
must use one hand to neutralize the force vector acting on his body; i f  
restrained, the inefficiencies of the harness/  anchor point reduce his 
capability. 
seem to affect the worker output a s  measured in horsepower (HP). 
indicates that the HP could easily be reduced to 50 percent of his normal , 
capability to compensate f o r  Newton's second law. In any event, the remain- 
ing force producing capability seems adequate to perform a properly planned 
repair . 
If unrestrained, the worker 
The effects of reduced gravity and/or body plus equipment mass  
Figure 3.5 
' !\ 
Work Costs a r e  manifest in the form of an increase in 0 2  consumption 
and GO2 output. A s  indicated by Figure 3. 6, these could easily increase to 
200 percent under zero g, imposing a heavier load on the atmospheric control 
functions. 
3.3 MAINTAINABILITY CONSTRAINTS 
The ability to repair and maintain a system depends, in large measure, 
In Figure 3.3, a log-normal curve was presented as  depicting on the design. 
the distribution of time required to perform the expected maintenance actions. 
The mean time to repair (MTTR) was actually near to 14 minutes. 
data were not taken from a maintainable design. 
Figure 3.7, it has been shown that active maintenance time could be reduced 
to less than half through packaging for maintenance. 
design i s  presented by one Apollo Component shown in Figure 3.8. 
These 
A s  indicated by the data of 
An example of such a I 
\ 
. j  
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4,O THE EXTENDED MISSION IMPLICATIONS 
4.1 THE ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE APPLIED 
It has been established that systems will probably fail and that repair 
However, maintenance may not be the only 
~ 
i s  both necessary and possible. 
solution, and indeed, is not expected to be the single solution. 
ability concept has been shown to be an  effective way of resolving the potential 
problems, and during this study, each subcontractor applied the concept to 
his respective system to demonstrate i ts  application and to determine the 
resultant requirements. 
The avail- 
/--- 
Detailed logic fo r  the analysis is  presented and explained in Section 1, 5. 
It may be summarized and its application illustrated by Figure 4. 1. 
In this example, the Space Radiator was one potential weak link. 
impractical to repair but could be resolved by dividing it into six sections, 
It was 
any four of which will handle the expected load. The Cabin Temperature 
Control was spared because it could easily be replaced by removing four 
screws and an Amphenol connector. 
was made redundant because of the time constraint on the coolant loop. 
1 The Space Radiator Outlet Check Valve 
The same approach was used on all the subsystems. The objective of 
each action recommended was to reduce the risk of a non-repairable failure - 
to an  acceptable level and to equalize the probability associated with each 
'component within the function so that there were no Ilbuilt-in" weakness that 
could not be compensated for by a maintenance action. 
Another example is presented in Figure 4.2, the Attitude and Stability , ( i  
Control System (A&SCS). The top level reliability logic indicates that the i 
Attitude Hold - Vehicle Maneuver function is the only weak link. 
evaluated as to potential operational concepts and through weak link analysis. 
The artificial g/zero g combination was found to be a more reliable concept 
although they could be made equal at the expense of 37 additional repair 
actions for the 0 "g" mission. The second level logic indicates that the 
automatic mode is weakest. 
corrections can be identified. Replacement at the module level is recom- 
mended because of the lower weight penalty and higher Ps. 
could be corrected through maintenance. 
It was 
From Figure 4 . 3 ,  the causes and recommended 
Al l  weakness 
- 2 3 - -  
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, 
1, 
/Figure 4. 1 The Logic of Availability Analysis 
~ ~~ - I  
I and Design for Maintenance 
MISSION CONCEPT DUTY CYCLE COMPLEXITY REL 
9.4 "G'f 0 "G" COMBO 904 hrs ' low 0.74 * 
ZERO GRAVITY ONLY 16,8CO hrs high 0.01 
RELIABILITY LOGIC 
2ND LEVEL REL. LOGIC 
* 8794 4. 8793-1 
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I 
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4.2 BASELINE MISSION IMPLICATIONS 
In determining the baseline mission implications, each subcontractor 
designed a system which would meet the functional requirements using 
contemporary hardware, using Apollo where possible; then proceeded with 
the analysis. Details a r e  presented in Section 4 of Volume III. 
of the resulting support requirements i s  presented in Table 4. 1 and 4.2. 
They indicate that to perform the baseline mission in the manner prescribed: 
A summary 
1. The probability of safe return could exceed 0.993. 
2. Only about 908 pounds of spares may be required. 
3. No more than 258 unscheduled maintenance actions a r e  expected. 
4. 
5. 
The minimum system availability will probably exceed 0.9996. 
Some design implications were involved: 
Design actions, over and above those planned fromanApollo/AAP spacecraft 
were required. Some of the more important a r e  listed briefly in Table 4.3 
and elaborated in detail in Volume III. 
4.3 EARTH ORBITAL MISSIONS LMPLICATIONS 
In paragraph 2.3, the commonalities between earth orbit mission (EO) 
Briefly, requirements and the baseline planetary mission were established. 
they have common functional requirements, varying only in the duration of 
specific phases. Therefore, choice of the two-year baseline mission used 
herein embodies most, or all of the critical functions required for an EO 
mission. However, since there a re  two distinct operations associated with 
the space station, these must be considered in the application of the foregoing 
data. I 
i 
Figure 4.4 presents the distribution of required functions between the 
space station and the logistic vehicle. 
design study of an orbiting space station. 
concept involved the launch of the space station, unmanned, and a separate , 
launch of the logistic vehicle every 90  days thereafter. The logistic vehicle 
remained docked a t  the space station throughout the 90-day period, making 
any velocity vector corrections required. 
logic of Figure 4.4 applies and the system support requirements a r e  estimated 
station: 
This concept results from a NR/SD 
The recommended operational 
Under that concept, the functional 
to be a s  presented in Table 4.3. These data indicate that for the space i t  
h 
\ i  
1. The probability of safe return can exceed 0.99976. 
2. The probability of no abort can exceed 0.996. 
- 25 - 
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2ND LEVEL, ATTITUDE HOLD - VEHICLE MANEUVER FUNCTION 
RELIABILITY LOGIC 
SUB FUNCTIONS 
1. GDC 
2. ECA 
3. GYRO ASSEMBLY 
4. FDIA 
5. EDA 
SYSTEM TOTAL 
P s  = CONTRIBUTION 
RO 
.887 
.976 
.990 
-994 
.76 
1 PROBAB 
BLACK BOX LEVEL 
P s  I SPARES I WEIGHT-LB 
.993 2 49.4 
.9995 1 16. 1 
.995 1 22.5 
1 8.9 
1 24.8 .9998 
.992* 6 121.7 
I T Y  OF SAFE RETURN 
*BACKUP MODES INCREASE THIS VALUE TO OVER .9994 
MODULE LEVEL 
PS SPARES 
.998 4 
.9999 6 
.995 1 
1 
1 .9997 
.997* I 13 
WEIGHT-LB 
12.2 
4. 1 
7.0 
8.9 
7. 5 
39. 7 
itude and Stability - 
- 
ING SPACE STATION FUNCTION 
I 
SPACECRAFT 
LOGISTIC VEHICLE FUNCTIONS 
GUIDANCE UP-DATA PROPULSION * 
Figure 4 .4  Earth Orbit Mission - SAFE RETURN 
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! 
- - 'SD' 67-478-4 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
, i=i 
h 
cd u 
.rl 
c, 
.rl 
k 
c, 
.r( 
4 
u 
h 
k 
Y 
8 
E 
E 
3 m 
rn 
a, 
c, 
rn 
h 
m 
$ 
5 
5 
.rl 
c, 
.r( 
rn 
m 
k u 
d 
2 
a, 
P 
cd 
E 
d 
h 
c, 
.r( 
d z 
cd 
.r( 
d 
L2 
E 
a, 
c, 
rn 
3. rn 
rd 
k 
u 
a, u 
cd 
P 
v1 
G 
N 0 m o  9, . .  
Ln 0 0 cr) c o r n 0  
0 
g o r - ‘  
cr) 
m m 
0 
N m c o  4 9 Ln m d *  
4 4 4  4 4 4 4 4 4  
\- 27 - 
b 
9 
4 
- 
Ln 
0 
0 
rn 
d 
c, 
cd 
0 
E 
h 
c, 
4 A
cd u 
.r( 
c, 
.r( 
k 
H 
u - 
- 
SD 67-478- 4 
2 
a, 
c, 
m 
h 
tn 
? 
.rl 
c, .rl
m 
tn 
c, 
k 
0 
2 
0 u 
3 
u 
a, 
k 
N 
4- 
a, 
P 
rd 
E 
d 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
0 0  0 0 
. .  
0 0 0  
h 
k 
0 u 
Q) 
k 
$ 
0" 
\ 
a 
tn 
4 u w 
4 
0 
k 
c, r= 
0 
V 
h 
> 
rd 
c, 
.rl 
s 
i -  28 *- 
SD 67-478- 4 
SPACE DIVISION OF NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION 
/ Table 4. 3; Design Implications 
System 
1. Propulsion 
2. Electrical Power 
3. Artificial Gravity 
Systems 
4. C ommuni cation s 
Systems 
5. Structure 
6. Maintenance 
Concept 
7. ECLSS 
Design Lmplications 
Three-engine configuration 
Common thrust structure 
2 of 3 normally operative 
Redundant pres surant function 
Pressure relief during non-use::: 
Purge lines and engine after usage::: 
Isotope power source recommended 
Redundant CRU loops recommended 
Backup cascade thermoelectric power 
Redundant cooling required96 
Redundant cable-drum and motor required 
Jetti son malfunctioning retraction components 
Provide fo r  powered rendezvous a s  a backup 
recommended 
. 
concept96 
~ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
Develop Passive Antenna System::< 
Develop High Power TWT’s 
Metecmid necessitates use of multilayer design and 
four pounds per foot2 a s  average density of skin 
Design for M&R at Module/subassembly level 
Fault Isolation to parallel maintenance concept%\ 
Minimize test  points 
Multi-loop Space Radiator Design Required 
Redundant water Recovery Loop 
Backup C 0 2  Reduction (Bosch System) 
*Recommended concept, not required to meet objectives 
3. Only 680 pounds of spares may be required for a full two-year 
mission, i. e., no resupply required for critical functions. 
4. There may be no more than 192 unscheduled maintenance actions. 
5 .  The minimurn systems availability will probably exceed 0.9997. 
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These reductions in support requirements and increase in  Ps a r e  due 
to the logistic vehicle carrying many of the high failure systems and only 
operating for a 90-day period. 
4.4 DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS 
The results of the study in  general indicate that: 
1. Contemporary hardware (Apollo/AAP level technology) can fulfill 
most of the system functional requirements. 
2. Relatively minor modifications may be required to achieve the 
desired maintainability. 
3 .  Repackaging, in some cases, i s  required to assure accessibility 
to components scheduled for maintenance. 
A s  indicated in Tables 4. 2, 4. 3, and 4.4, most of the systems a r e  
nearly qualified a t  the function level; the remaining test  requirements involve 
life demonstrations to meet the new mission duration. Some functions, such 
a s  the propulsion engines, a r e  required to operate for less  than the qualified 
time on the planetary and earth orbit missions. However, these components 
require test to demonstrate their capability to withstand the long, deep- space 
exposure - for planetary missions only. 
Some of the major development programs required are:  
1. Cabin temperature /humidity control physic s 
2. Carbon dioxide control 
3 .  Cabin atmospheric control and 0 2  regeneration 
4. W a t e  r / Urine recovery 
5. Electrical Power Source - a combined Isotope Organic Rankine 
cycle with a Thermoelectric system to provide emergency power. 
This combination seems the most desirable from a reliability/ 
safety point of view. 
must be developed: 
To support this system, these functions 
a. High temperature loops 
b. Combined Rotating Units 
c. Isotope sources 
6. Artificial gravity physics 
- 31 - 1 
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Some development programs recommended to improve performance 
but not necessarily required, involve: 
1. High-gain antenna - passive 
2. Gyros - particularly for stable platforms and momentum exchange 
control systems 
3. Microelectronics for use in communications, data, and control 
functions 
r 4.5 EVA IMPLICATIONS 
Since the study was devoted to an analysis of all potential system 
A concerted 
failures , inherent within them a re  those requiring extra-vehicular activity to 
accomplish the identified maintenances and repair action. 
effort was made to minimize these; however, a few remain as possible but 
very remotely so, As indicated by Table 4. 5 where the potential tasks a r e  
listed, the cumulative chance is  less  than 2 x fo r  any two-year mission. 
Table 4. 5. Potential EVA Task Requirements fo r  Extended 
Space Missions 
Task 
Descriptions 
Repair Puncture 
-Space Radiator 
- C abin Wal l  
Replace 
-Engine Quad, RCS 
o r  Grav. Cont. 
Replace 
Main Engine 
Gimbal Actuator 
Replace 
Antenna, DSIF 
Drive Unit 
Activities 
Required 
Epoxy Patch 
Epoxy Patch 
4 AN Bolts 
2 AN Fittings 
1 Elec. Conn. 
2 AN Bolts 
2 Fasteners 
1 Elec. Conn. 
8 AN Bolts 
Elec. Conn. 
8 Fasteners 
"Requiring EVA support 
mAssumes use of backup antenna prior to EVA 
Force Producing 
Requirements 
10-20 lbs in translation 
40-70 in-lbs torque, 20 lbs 
in translation 
30-50 in-lbs torque 
5-8 in-lbs torque 
50-100 in-lbs torque 
10-20 in-lb torque, 20 lbs 
in translation 
5-8 in-lbs torque 
40-70 in-lbs torque 
5-8 in-lbs torque 
10-20 in-lbs torque, 20 lbs 
translation 
Chance is 
Required 
TOTAL <2 x 10-4 
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The study demonstrated conclusively that, long duration, manned space 
flights can be made safely when designed around the availability concept. 
Further, it demonstrated that contemporary hardware can be used to fu l f i l l  
many of the systems functional requirements, 
Although the absolute value of the data presented herein may be open 
to question, their relative value and "ball park" levels a r e  unquestionably 
valid. The data baseline used in this study is that taken from systems and 
components of known ability in terms of reliability and space rating. This 
factor alone is enough to assure confidence in the results, In addition, the 
designs employed these hardware elements in the same functions and environ- 
ment wherein they were qualified. 
i d  
3 i, _" 
Some of the more profound conclusions to be drawn relevant to the 
baseline mission a re :  
1. Much of the required hardware is available and nearly qualified. 
2. Maintenance and repair is both feasible and desirable, 
3 .  The operational concept can exert a pronounced influence on 
mission success and safety. 
4. The unscheduled maintenance and repair work load required to 
support critical systems will be low, probably less than one in a 
three-day period. 
5. The chance of an extra-vehicular maintenance action is expected to 
be less than 1/1000. 
6. The chance of more than 260 M&R actions per two-year mission i s  
expected to be less than 1/100. 
7. The spares weight decrement will be low, about 900 pounds for 
unscheduled maintenance actions. 
8. The module/assembly level is the optimum level for  maintenance 
and replacement for most of the potential failures. 
9. The required maintenance actions can be performed within the 
expected downtime constraints. 
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6.0 SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS 
The results of the study provided some significant contributions to 
space mission planning technology. These a r e  elaborated on in Volumes I, 
It,and III; 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
but, in s m m a r y ,  they involve: 
Development of an extended mission design concept. 
Definition of the space mission maintenance and repair problems. 
Definition of system downtime physics. 
Development of the technology associated with reducing and 
equalizing the failure hazard. 
Development of an efficient mission simulation technique which 
permits assessment of mission success and design optimization 
around this factor. 
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